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Abstract 
This article appraised the techniques employed for the division of legislative powers under federal constitutions 
generally and under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 in particular. In doing justice to the 
topic, the paper examined the two models for dividing legislative powers namely, the integrated or interlocking 
model and the dualist or classical model of which it was discovered that the latter is the model largely followed 
by the CFRN 1999. It also considered the method of dividing legislative powers by enumeration and by 
allocation of residual power; rationale or criteria for division of powers and symmetrical versus asymmetrical 
distribution of legislative powers. The author among others discovered that while the division of legislative 
powers under the CFRN 1999 is largely symmetrical, the rationale for the division could hardly be generalised in 
comparison with other federal constitutions. 
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Introduction 
This paper focuses on an examination of the techniques employed for the division of legislative powers 
under federal constitutions in general and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) 1999 (as 
altered) in particular. Division of powers is a normal and universal incidence of all federal states1. As noted by 
Wheare, the federal principle refers to the “method of dividing power so that general and regional governments 
are each within a sphere co-ordinate and independent.”2 This same thought is reiterated by Nwabueze when he 
defines federalism as:  
an arrangement whereby powers of government within a country are shared 
between a national, country-wide government and a number of regionalised 
(i.e. territorially localised) governments in such a way that each exists as a 
government separately and independently from the others operating directly 
on persons and property within its territorial area, with a will of its own and 
its own apparatus for the conduct of its affairs, and with an authority in some 
matters exclusive of all the others.3 
 
As discernible from the above, federalism as a form of constitutional arrangement and political organisation of a 
state has to do with division of powers between a federal government4 and state governments5 of the component 
parts of a country. Now, state power is usually divided into three, namely: judicial power, executive power and 
legislative power. This is in consonance with the constitutional principle of separation of powers6. 
This paper focussing as it is on techniques for division of legislative powers under the CFRN 1999 is 
therefore only concerned with an aspect of the broader issue of division of powers and an aspect of the more 
specific issue of division of legislative powers under federal constitutions. Without any gainsaying the fact, the 
nature, extent and mode of division of powers between a federal government and state governments is a major 
factor in determining whether a country’s system of government is actually federal, confederal, semi-federal or 
unitary. As put by Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Federal and unitary systems are ideal types, representing the 
endpoints of a continuum”7  
This actually becomes more pertinent when the peculiar nature of Nigeria’s federalism is taken into 
consideration. For instance, Nigeria actually operates a unitary (that is, one) constitution for its federal 
governmental arrangement. This no doubt is an incongruity. As put by Nwabueze, “Few contradictions could be 
                                                 
1
 The word ‘states’ is used in this instance in the same sense as the concept of ‘State’ under international law. See Art.1, 
Monteviddo Convention on Rights and Duties of States 1933 (1934) 165 L.N.T.S. 19 
2
 KC Wheare Federal Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4th edn, 1964). See also KM Mowoe Constitutional 
Law in Nigeria (Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited, 2008) p.49. 
3
 BO Nwabueze The Presidential Constitution of Nigeria (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1982) p.37. 
4
 Also “national government”, “central government”, “nation-wide government” or “country-wide government”.  
5
 Also “provincial governments”, “regional governments”, “sub-national governments” or “intermediate governments”.  
6
 The principle of separation of powers is well entrenched in the CFRN 1999 (as altered). See sections 4, 5 and 6 which 
respectively vest legislative, executive and judicial powers in separate organs and persons. 
7
 “constitutional law”, Encyclopaedia Britannica Student and Home Edition (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica,  2010) 
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more self-evident than that of a unitary constitution for a federal system of government. For unitarism and 
federalism are mutually exclusive, logically opposing concepts.”1 
It should be noted also that the idea of a government implies a constitution. Nwabueze in the following 
words further elucidates this point: 
In this sense, which is the sense in which it was originally used, a 
constitution refers simply to the frame or composition of a government, to 
the way in which a government is actually structured in terms of its organs, 
the distribution of powers within it, the relations of its organs inter se, and 
the procedures for exercising powers.2 
 
This is the same sense in which Mcllwain defines the word “constitution” taking it to mean “the substantive 
principles to be deduced from a nation’s actual institutions.”3 The normal practice therefore is for states in 
federal systems to: 
…have their own constitutions that define the institutions of their respective 
governments, as well as the powers that are devolved further to their local 
governments. Such constitutional arrangements are a guarantee against 
possible efforts of the central government to enlarge its jurisdiction and so 
imperil the important political role that intermediate governments play in a 
federal system.4 
 
The CFRN 1999 in this respect differs from the 1960 Independence Constitution which by virtue of the Nigeria 
(Constitution) Order in Council 1960 makes provision for the Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria in its 2nd 
Schedule and its 3rd, 4th and 5th Schedules respectively makes provision for the Constitution of Northern Nigeria, 
the Constitution of Western Nigeria and the Constitution of Eastern Nigeria. 5  This arrangement was also 
followed in 1963 under the Republican Constitution whereby the Federal Parliament reviewed the federal 
constitution and therein granted authority to regional legislatures to enact their own constitutions. 6  The 
arrangement was however discarded under the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions for reasons best known to the 
drafters of these constitutions reverting to the 19517 and 19548 constitutional form of organizing both the federal 
and regional governments under only one constitution. 
It should also be noted that the current division of powers was actually arrived at by a process of 
devolution of government unlike what normally operates in federal states where the federating units or states are 
the ones that willingly and by (constitutional) agreement relinquish part of their powers (particularly 
sovereignty) to the federal or central government. In Nigeria’s case, an almighty central government was already 
in existence before part of its powers was devolved unto regional governments due to political agitation for self 
rule and regional autonomy particularly during the colonial period9.  
The drafting committee on the review of the Nigerian Constitution in 1951 in this respect observed as 
follows: 
The federal governments of U.S.A., Canada and Australia have been built 
on the basis of separate states surrendering to a federal government some of 
their powers for the benefit of all. The reverse process on which we are 
engaged – that of the creation of a federal government by devolution – is a 
political experience for which – there is no precedent to guide us and we are 
very conscious of the dangers involved in such an experiment10. 
As aforesaid, the immediate aim of this article is to examine the techniques for division of legislative powers 
employed under the CFRN 1999 (as altered) with reference to the practice of federations across the world11 
                                                 
1
  B Nwabueze, Constitutional Democracy in Africa vol.1 (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2003), p.1. 
2
  B Nwabueze, Ideas and Facts in Constitution Making (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 1993) p.1. 
3
 CH Mcllwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (1940) available at 
<http://www.constitution.org/cmt/mcil w/mcilw.htm>  (accessed 18 October 2012). 
4
 ‘constitutional law’. Encyclopaedia Britannica Student and Home Edition, Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica,  2010. 
5
 See JA Yakubu, Trends in Constitution Making in Nigeria, (Ibadan: Demyaxs Law Books, 2003) pp.5-6. 
6
 See Nwabueze, above n 8, p.63. 
7
 Macpherson’s Constitution. 
8
 Lyttelton’s Constitution. 
9
 See MO Adediran Constitutional History of Nigeria (Ile-Ife: Cleanprint, 2004) for a succinct account of Nigeria’s 
constitutional history. 
10
 See Nwabueze, above n 8, p.62 
 
11
 G Anderson Federalism: An Introduction (Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2008) p.22.  
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highlighting the underlying theoretical and philosophical bases.  To this end, this article considers the two 
models for dividing legislative powers; division by enumeration and by allocation of residual power; rationale or 
criteria for division of powers and symmetrical versus asymmetrical distribution. 
 
Models for dividing legislative powers  
 A quick survey of patterns or modes of distributing legislative powers in most constitutions will reveal 
two dominant models which are the integrated or interlocking model and the dualist or classical model. Under 
the integrated or interlocking model, the power to legislate on most of the specified subject-matters are jointly 
shared by the federal and state governments. Only a few subject matters (such as defence, currency and 
customs/excise taxes) are exclusive to the federal government. Where this model is in operation, the federal 
government, in exercising its concurrent powers, will enact laws that give broad policy framework which the 
member units “can complement (but not contravene) with their own legislation.”1 This model, according to 
Anderson, is also sometimes called administrative federalism because the principal powers of the constituent 
units are administrative.2 This however does not mean that the member units are mere appendages of the central 
government. For instance, in Germany (which aptly exemplifies the model), before federal laws are made in the 
areas of concurrency, the support of the representatives of the Länder3 in the Bundesrat4 by way of a majority 
vote, must be obtained. Other countries that follow this model are South Africa, Austria and Spain. 
 The dualist model is also known as the classical model of federalism. It is so named because it proposes 
a neat division of powers between the federal government and the state governments. Constitutional jurisdiction 
over certain subject matters should thus be specifically granted to one order of government to the exclusion of 
the other. The dualist model in practice however does not achieve the desired neat division or separation of 
powers as many issues cut across regional, national and international interests and inter-governmental 
consultation and cooperation are daily facts of governmental practice among various federations of the world. In 
fact, virtually all dualist constitutions have some areas of concurrent exercise of legislative powers. Brazil, 
Canada and the United States of America largely follow the dualist model.   
Nigeria also largely follows this model. This is because section 4(1) of the CFRN 1999 vests the 
legislative powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in a National Assembly for the Federation while section 
4(6) vests the legislative powers of a State in the House of Assembly of that State Assembly. The National 
Assembly is a bicameral legislative body consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The National 
Assembly normally exercises exclusive and concurrent legislative powers by the combined reading of section 
4(2), (3) and (4). Both the Exclusive Legislative List with 68 items and Concurrent Legislative List with 12 
items are contained in the Second Schedule to the Constitution. There are however other matters in the body of 
the Constitution upon which the National Assembly exercises either exclusive or concurrent legislative powers.  
State legislative powers under the CFRN 1999 are three-fold. First are the powers relating to matters 
expressly provided for in the body of the Constitution. Examples here are state legislative powers in relation to: 
public order and public security5, regulation of Local Government system6, creation of new local governments7, 
passage of Appropriation Bills8, and prescription of powers of and procedure to be followed by a panel set up to 
investigate allegation of gross misconduct against a Governor9. 
Next are legislative powers granted under the Concurrent Legislative List and it should be noted that the 
Constitution has gone to a great extent to delineate between the concurrent powers exercisable by both Federal 
and State Legislatures so that the powers of both levels of government may not necessarily be co-extensive over 
all areas of the specified matters. That is, they may simply co-exist with respect to some aspects of the specified 
matters. In fact, the Concurrent Legislative List under the CFRN 1999 is somehow innovative in its approach. 
Credence is given to this observation because instead of simply enumerating the areas of concurrent legislative 
competence, the Constitution goes ahead to carefully define the scope of Federal and State powers in respect of 
the enumerated items. Hence, the fact that a matter appears on the Concurrent List does not mean that both the 
Federal and State Governments can legislate over the entire field. The specifications and limitations set against 
each matter on the list must be had in view to determine the legislative powers exercisable thereunder. In doing 
                                                 
1
 Ibid. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 That is the member units or states of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
4
 That is the 69-member Upper Chamber or Federal Council. See "Germany" in Encyclopaedia Britannica Student and Home 
Edition, Chicago, Encyclopædia Britannica, 2010. 
5
 Section 11. 
6
 Section 7. 
7
 Section 8. 
8
 Section 120 (2), (3), (4). 
9
 Section 188 (7). 
 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.29, 2014 
 
130 
this, the Constitution seems to have actually in certain respects granted exclusive legislative powers respectively 
to both the Federal and State Governments over the specified areas of some of the enumerated matters on a 
Concurrent Legislative List! .  
The third category consists of legislative powers referred to by section 4(7)(a) as relating to “any matter 
not included in the Exclusive Legislative List,” and it by implication includes any matter not also included in the 
Concurrent Legislative List. This in other words refers to the residual legislative powers of the States making up 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
 Switzerland and India have strong features of both the integrated model and the dualist model. But 
while Australia is largely dualist in arrangements, its large areas of concurrency make it to also possess features 
of the integrated model. The basic fact though is that no federation is purely of one form to the exclusion of the 
other. All share certain features of both models - it is the degree of conformity that differs.1  
 
Enumerated and residual powers 
 A universal technique for the division of legislative powers in federal constitutions is the use of 
enumerated powers and assignment of residual powers. There are different ways by which legislative powers are 
assigned via enumeration. First is to have only one list containing subject-matters upon which either the federal 
government or the state government exercises exclusive legislative competence. Where this occurs, the other 
government will be assigned the residual legislative powers. The United States Constitution for example contain 
only one list of enumerated powers exercisable by the Federal Government thereby reserving all other powers 
not specifically mentioned to the states.2  
 Second is to have two lists – an exclusive list and a concurrent list. This as previously stated is the 
method adopted by Nigeria under the CFRN 1999 which contains an Exclusive Legislative List set out in Part l 
of the Second Schedule to the Constitution upon which the National Assembly can legislate and a Concurrent 
Legislative List set out in the first column of Part II of the Second Schedule to the Constitution upon which both 
the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly can legislate to the extent prescribed in the second column 
thereto.3  
 A federal constitution may also contain three legislative lists which will contain two exclusive 
legislative lists – one for the federal government and the other for the state government. The third list will then 
be a concurrent list upon which both levels of government can legislate. The Indian and Canadian Constitutions 
typify this arrangement. The Indian Constitution has what it calls the Union list, State list and Concurrent list. 
The Indian Constitution also grants the Union Parliament the power to make laws with respect to any matter for 
any part of the territory of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated 
in the State list.4 
 It should be noted however that apart from the legislative lists, power to legislate over certain matters 
may equally be assigned to either level of government elsewhere in the Constitution. The CFRN 1999 for 
example in section 11 bequeaths the power to legislate on public order and public security on both the National 
Assembly and the State House of Assembly. The section states:  
(1). The National Assembly may make laws for the Federation or any 
part thereof with respect to the maintenance and securing of public safety 
and public order and providing, maintaining and securing of such supplies 
and services as may be designated by the National Assembly as essential 
supplies and services. 
 
(2). Nothing in this section shall preclude a House of Assembly from 
making laws with respect to the matter referred to in this section, including 
the provision for the maintenance and securing of such supplies and services 
as may be designated by the National Assembly as essential supplies and 
services. 
 
What are the implications of dividing legislative powers via enumerated and residual powers? According to 
Nwabueze: 
                                                 
1Anderson, above n 18, p.22.  
2
 See Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and sections 51 and 90 of the Constitution of  the Commonwealth 
of Australia  
 
3
 Section 4. 
4
 See Articles 245-246 of the Indian Constitution.  
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Having only one list of matters exclusive to either the national or regional 
governments and leaving the residue to the other has the advantage of 
simplicity and eliminates the uncertainty and conflict which necessarily 
result from a second (i.e. concurrent) list; a third list inevitably adds to such 
uncertainly and conflict.1  
 
It would thus seem that having only one exclusive legislative list is a better arrangement thereby avoiding the 
perceived disadvantages of uncertainty, cumbersomeness and conflict occasioned especially by the existence of a 
concurrent list. The truth however is that even in federations where the federal constitution contains only one list, 
disputes over what constitute a constitutional exercise of legislative powers between the federal government and 
the states are not uncommon.2  
However the advantages of assigning exclusive legislative responsibility to one level of government or 
another are somewhat obvious. And it needs be pointed out that residual legislative authority is also exclusive to 
whatever level of government it is assigned by the Constitution. Exclusive legislative authority reinforces the 
autonomy and independence of each level of government. This as previously explained is an important feature of 
federalism whish primarily concerns itself with the delicate balancing of shared rule with self rule. Also, 
exclusivity makes evident the government responsible for policy formulation and implementation in particular 
areas. 
Nonetheless, as pointed out by Watts;  
… even where most powers are assigned exclusively to one level of 
government or the other, experiences such as those of Switzerland, Canada 
and Belgium indicate that it is virtually impossible to define watertight 
compartments of jurisdiction and some intergovernmental interaction are 
unavoidable.3 
 
A recognition of this inevitable feature of federal systems has in practice “softened the exclusivity of the 
allocated powers even where they have been emphasized”4 thus leading to extensive concurrent legislative areas 
being ab initio assigned by the constitutions of some federal countries such as Nigeria, Australia, Germany, 
Mexico and Brazil.  
It can be said then that a number of advantages do attach to the use of the technique of concurrent 
legislative powers. Some of the advantages have been clearly articulated by Watts. 5  According to him, 
concurrency provides an element of flexibility in the distribution of powers, enabling constituent unit legislatures 
to pursue their own initiatives until such time as the subject becomes one requiring federal action. Also, 
especially in providing essential social services, concurrency provides a means by which the federal government 
“may legislate to secure a basic national uniformity and to guide regional legislation, while leaving with the 
regional legislatures the initiative for details and for adaptation to local circumstances”. In a country like 
Germany (and to some respects in Brazil, Mexico and Spain), the federal government is constitutionally 
specially empowered to enact “framework legislation” in certain fields so that the Lander may then by legislation 
supply the missing details. 
Also, concurrency permits the federal government to intervene in normally regional fields of activity so 
as to “provide remedies for particularly backward regions or for difficulties arising from regional legislation 
which affects other regions”. Next, concurrent listing of legislative powers equally obviates the need for 
complicated and detailed enumeration of legislative jurisdictions for each level of government thereby avoiding 
the inevitable possibility of such detailed divisions and sub-divisions of responsibilities becoming obsolete and 
restrictive over time. And as earlier noted, the use of the concurrency technique also encourages cooperation 
among the different levels of government thus facilitating “cooperative federalism” and unity in diversity. 
It may also be apposite to quote the observation of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional 
Reforms on the necessity for the use of the concurrency technique: 
Experience has shown, both in India and elsewhere, that there are certain 
matters which cannot be allocated exclusively either to a central or to a 
                                                 
1
 Nwabueze, above n 3, p.45. 
2
 See Constitution of Australia, available at <http://www.experiencefestival.com/a/constitution-of-Australia /id/1922947>  
(accessed on 22 February 2011)  
3
 RL Watts, “Comparative Conclusions” <http://www.federalism.ch/files/categories/IntensivkursII/comparative g2.pdf> 
(accessed on 23 April 2012). 
4
 loc cit. 
5
 Generally Watts, above n 34. Also see Nwabueze, above n 3, pp. 45-46 quoting Watts, New Federations: Experiments in the 
Commonwealth (1966) pp 174-175. 
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Provincial legislature and for which though it is often desirable that 
provincial legislation should make provision, it is equally necessary that the 
central legislature should also have a legislative jurisdiction enable it, in 
some cases to secure uniformity in the main principles of law throughout  the 
country, in others, to guide and encourage provincial effort and in others, 
again to provide remedies for mischief arising in the provincial sphere, but 
extending, or liable to extend beyond the boundaries of a single province.1  
 
On the use of the residual legislative power, it is important to note that while the extent of this power will 
definitely be influenced by the extent of the enumerated powers, it is of itself at the theoretical level infinite 
being not enumerated. Also while the power is usually granted to the states, it may also be granted to the federal 
government. The Indian Constitution following the Canadian model for example grants the residual powers to 
the Union Parliament. The CFRN 1999 however follows the United States model in assigning residual power to 
the states. In the same vein, the essence of the use of residual powers come to the fore when we realise that no 
matter how detailed enumeration is, some matters will still be omitted either due to oversight or because such are 
currently envisaged by no one from practical and experiential point of view.  
One thing is certain, all federations via the use of enumerated and residual powers seek to pragmatically 
balance a system of shared powers and responsibilities consequently promoting interaction between the orders of 
government (integrated or cooperative federalism) on one hand with a system of independent and exclusive 
operation of the dual orders of government thus promoting self rule and handling of matters of local concern 
peculiarly as occasions demand (dualist federation) on the other hand. 
 
Rationale or criteria for distributing legislative powers 
A careful survey of the patterns of dividing legislative powers in various federal constitutions will 
hardly indicate an adherence to some universally accepted logical criteria. Instead, it seems that the criteria 
adopted in deciding upon the contents and modes of enumerated or residual legislative powers are largely 
informed by a process of political bargaining and interest groups compromises resulting from historical and 
socio-cultural experiences of the peoples of each federation.  
For example, while some matters such as defence, customs/excise taxes, currency and external affairs 
always or usually fall under federal legislative competence, others such as post-secondary education, agriculture, 
mineral resources and criminal law have no clear pattern. Also while the Constitution of a country like the 
United States contains only 12 enumerated items, that of India contains three long lists- the Union list has 97 
headings, the Concurrent list has 47 and the State list has 66. The Canadian Constitution originally had only 
agriculture and immigration2 as areas of concurrent jurisdiction. To these have been added by constitutional 
amendments - old age, pensions and supplementary benefits,3 and export of non-renewable natural resources, 
forest products and electrical energy.4  
A lot also depends on the process by which the federation is established. Where the process involves the 
coming together of previously independent or distinct units, since the units already possess specified or 
unlimited legislative authority, the new federal government will only be given exclusive and concurrent 
legislative authority in areas necessary for its effective functioning while the residual powers will remain with 
the member units. Switzerland, the United States and Australia are classic examples of this. 
On the other hand, where as is the case in Spain and Belgium, the federation is created through a 
process of devolution of powers from a previously unitary state, the tendency is for the federal government to 
retain most of the powers while those of the units are clearly specified and the residual authority remains 
reserved to the federal government. In countries such as Nigeria, Brazil and Mexico which have experienced 
periods of military or authoritarian rule, the tendency is to have a relatively centralised division of legislative 
powers but in order to reflect the change to democratic rule, residual powers are reserved to the states while 
federal exclusive and concurrent powers are specified. Also, some federations such as India and Canada were 
established out of the processes of aggregation and devolution and their constitutions provide for exclusive 
federal, exclusive state or provincial and concurrent powers with residual legislative powers going to the federal 
government. 
                                                 
1
 Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms (1934) pp, 30-31, para 51 quoted by S, P. M. Bakshi, “Concurrent 
Powers of Legislation under List III of the Constitution” <http.//lawmin.nic.in/ncrw c/finalreport/v2b3-3.htm>  (accessed on 
2 February, 2011). 
 
2
 Section 95, Constitution Act (Canada) 
3
 Section 94 A, Constitution Act (Canada)  
4
 Watts, above n 34. 
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The period during which a Constitution is drafted is also important. The newer federal constitutions of 
the latter half of the 20th century for example contain much more detailed lists of legislative powers than the 
earlier ones of the 18th and 19th centuries which contain division of powers in fairly general terms. One may in 
this regard compare Indian Constitution’s exhaustive Union list (97 items), State list (66 items) and Concurrent 
list (47 items) with the United States Constitution’s 12 listed items.  
As noted by Watts; 
Another factor affecting the character of the constitutional distribution of 
powers is the influence of earlier models. The example of the United States 
was consciously in the minds of the constitution drafters in Switzerland, 
Australia, Germany, Brazil and Mexico while in India the Government of 
India Act, 1935- itself patterned on the Canadian model had a strong 
influence upon the Constituent Assembly shaping the new Constitution in 
1950.1 
 
The above observations of Watts are no doubt valid as touching the CFRN 1999 which to some extent seems to 
be patterned after the United States model. 
 The principle of subsidiarity has also been developed in rationalising the distribution of powers between 
a central government and the member units. This principle has recently come to prominence in Europe due to its 
inclusion in European Union treaties. According to Follesdal, the principle of subsidiarity “holds that authority 
should rest with the member units unless allocating them to a central unit would ensure higher comparative 
efficiency or effectiveness in achieving certain goals”.2 This has enabled the members of the European Union to 
continue to exercise exclusive legislative powers over traditional areas of federal governments such as defence 
and foreign policy.3 The principle as enshrined in the European Community Treaty 1957 (as amended)4 is to the 
effect that “in areas falling within its exclusive competence, the community shall take action only if be and in so 
far as its objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states.” 5  The practical essence of this 
principle is its ability to quell fears of undue centralisation resulting in an overtly strong central government 
which some member units may not be willing to permit in a federal arrangement. 
 
Symmetrical versus asymmetrical division 
A symmetrical division of legislative powers is the usual technique employed in most federal 
constitutions such as those of Nigeria, the United States, Australia, Germany, Switzerland and Mexico. By this 
arrangement, all member units enjoy equal or uniform legislative powers on the same fields of activity or 
matters. But sometimes, the asymmetrical division of powers may also be employed to cater for peculiar 
features, circumstances, needs, requirements or conditions of one or more member units. When the asymmetrical 
method is employed, there is some sort of variation in the legislative powers exercisable by member units or 
some member units enjoy greater autonomy than the others. India, Spain and Belgium are examples of countries 
that use the asymmetrical method.  
The Canadian constitutional division of powers is basically symmetrical in form but special provisions 
do exist allowing Quebec different authority from (though this is usually harmonized with) that of the other 
provinces. Part of the reasons for this asymmetry is to enable Quebec preserve its rich French cultural heritage 
and civil law system as opposed to the English heritage and common law system of the other provinces.6 In 
Spain, “historical communities” such as Catalonia, Navarre, Galicia and the Basque country have more powers 
than other autonomous communities, partly to deal with their distinctness and to appease nationalist leanings, 
partly out of the respect of privileges granted earlier in history.7  
Though not a federation, the asymmetrical devolution of legislative powers to Scotland by the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom is also quite significant.8 As pointed out by Watts, greater complexity is often 
                                                 
1
 Ibid. 
2
 A. Follesdal, “Federalism” in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries /federalism/> 
(accessed on 23 May 2011).  
3
 As at the date of writing this paper, the European Union is yet to empower Brussels in these areas. 
 
4
 Article 5, European Community Treaty (Treaty of Rome as amended) 1957. 
5
 See AW Bradley and KD Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd, 2007) p.132.  
 
6
 See The Canadian Encyclopaedia (2011 Historica-Dominion) <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia. 
com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA0002320>  (accessed on 2 February, 2011). 
7
 ‘Federalism’ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/federalism> (accessed on 23 May, 2011). 
8
 See A.W. Bradley and K.D. Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law op cit pp.44-46. 
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introduced where there is asymmetry in the constitutional jurisdiction assigned to the member units. 
Nevertheless, it appears that the experience of some federations  
has shown that the only way to accommodate sharply varying intensities 
in the pressures for political autonomy or to, as a transitional device, 
accommodate member units at different stages of political development; 
is to resort to constitutional asymmetry in the division of powers.1 
 
Some consequences of asymmetry division of powers are: pressure for the same treatment by others; pressure to 
limit the weight of representatives from the favoured unit(s) in the federal government’s decision making 
processes; and contentious counter-pressure for greater symmetry. Nonetheless, the use of asymmetry in a 
federation is quite effective in ensuring unity in diversity. It should also be noted that even in symmetrical 
federal constitutions, federal territories or peripheral associated states and federacies are often differently treated. 
For instance, the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja enjoys a special status under the CFRN 1999. 
 
Conclusion 
 As previously stated, an examination of the techniques for division of legislative powers must 
necessarily involve a consideration of federal principles and of pertinent provisions of federal constitutions. This 
is so as division of powers is a universal incidence of federalism and of nations which have embraced the federal 
system for their governmental arrangements. Unitary systems do not accommodate division of powers but 
devolution of powers. The latter concept describes what obtains in a unitary system of government where the 
(almighty) central government by statutory enactment grants a regional or local government some powers in 
specified areas. Yet, despite the creation of new level(s) of government and the devolved powers, the central 
government still retains executive and legislative powers over all of the country and may at any time (at least in 
theory) withdraw all or any of the devolved powers. For example, as pointed out by Bradley and Ewing, 
devolution in the United Kingdom “has come to mean the vesting of legislative and executive powers in elected 
bodies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, who thus acquire political responsibility for the devolved 
functions.” 2 
 Four basic matters concerning the techniques universally employed for division of legislative powers 
are considered in this paper. First are the two dominant models discernible in the distribution of legislative 
powers when most federal constitutions are surveyed. These are the integrated or interlocking model the dualist 
or classical model. While the CFRN 1999 (as altered) largely follows the dualist or classical model, it is clear 
that no federation fully adheres to one model to the exclusion of the other. 
 The technique of the use of enumerated powers and assignment of residual powers is secondly 
considered. This technique is utilized in Nigeria via an Exclusive Legislative List upon which only the Federal 
Legislature possesses legislative powers; a Concurrent Legislative List containing matters upon which both the 
Federal and State Legislatures may legislate to the extent prescribed by the Constitution, and the assignment of 
residual legislative powers to the States.  
 Also considered are criteria or rationale determining division of powers under federal constitutions. 
While there hardly exist any universally accepted logical criteria followed by federal constitutions in distributing 
legislative powers between Federal and State Governments, some factors do tend to affect the distribution 
patterns. These are: the process by which the Federation was established (that is, whether it was formed by the 
coming together of previously existing independent States or through a process of devolution of powers from a 
previously unitary State); the period the Constitution in question was drafted, and the application of the principle 
of subsidiarity. Finally, the technique of symmetrical or asymmetrical division of legislative powers was 
examined and it was discovered that the CFRN 1999 employs the former method.     
                                                 
1
 Watts, above n 34. 
 
2
 Bradley and Ewing, above n 45, p.43. 
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